Written by Rahul Lad, Ravindra Jaybhaye
India’s recent move to put the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance in the wake of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22 has caused a ripple in South Asia’s hydro-diplomatic circles. Among the most striking moves in the aftermath of the attack, the Indian government decided to temporarily suspend the six-decade-old IWT, a historic water sharing mechanism between India and Pakistan.
As one of the most successful water-sharing treaties in recent history, the IWT has been among the few beacons of cooperation between these geopolitical rivals. The IWT was signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan and was brokered by the World Bank. The treaty divides the Indus River system into the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, allocated to Pakistan) and the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, allocated to India). The treaty survived four major wars and countless skirmishes between the neighbors-turned-adversaries.
In recent decades, the combined effect of demographic stresses, environmental alteration, and the need for economic development has enormously accelerated water demand in the Indus Basin. In Jammu and Indian-administered Kashmir, a region centrally located in the Indus basin, the population has tripled between when the treaty began to be implemented in 1961 and 2011, going from 3.56 million to 12.5 million. Climate change has also introduced volatility into seasonal river flows as the Himalayan glaciers are retreating at an unprecedented rate. A renegotiation of the IWT was therefore already thought necessary to address the combined effects of a changing demographic, climatic, and developmental context.
In this sense, India’s move to put the IWT in abeyance was both a security response after Pahalgam, and also, likely, a broader strategic decision to renegotiate the treaty in light of these contemporary realities. However, the move may set a precedent for non-traditional security responses in the future and have broader implications for South Asia’s hydropolitics.
India’s move to put the IWT in abeyance was both a security response after Pahalgam, and also, likely, a broader strategic decision to renegotiate the treaty in light of these contemporary realities.
India and Pakistan Post-Abeyance
With the treaty in abeyance, India is no longer obligated to perform its duties such as sharing river water data with Pakistan, upholding restrictions on the storage of water in dams on western rivers, and conducting technical meetings. India has commenced efforts whose benefits are expected to materialize over the long term to assert its upper riparian benefit by expediting the development of hydro-infrastructure projects on the western rivers, such as the Pakal Dul, Kiru, Kwar, and Ratle hydropower projects on the Chenab River. In addition, the Indian government has also started reinvigorating the long stalled Tulbul Navigation Project in order to optimize the country’s share of water from the western rivers.
In the short term, India has reportedly modified water flow to Pakistan by intermittently closing and reopening dams such as Baglihar and Salal on the Chenab River without prior notification to Pakistan. Additionally, India has initiated flushing and desilting activities at several run-of-the-river projects, preparing them to store and manage water flow during the winter months—thereby enhancing its control over upstream water resources.
These actions hold tremendous significance for Pakistan’s economy. The Indus Basin sustains the world’s largest contiguous irrigation system and supports nearly 90 percent of Pakistan’s food production. Agriculture contributes 24 percent to Pakistan’s GDP and accounts for 37.4 percent of total employment. While unreported openings or closings of Baglihar and Salal will not immediately halt the natural flow of water to Pakistan, they have the potential to dent Pakistan’s heavily agriculture-dependent economy in the dry season when water is more scarce.
Broader Regional Implications
Since IWT has been regarded as an example of successful water-sharing between rivals, its abeyance is likely to have repercussions that extend beyond the immediate context of India–Pakistan relations.
The decision could trigger broader geopolitical implications across South Asia, particularly in the realm of regional water diplomacy. Pakistan’s response—seeking strategic collaboration with China to safeguard its long-term water security—underscores how the treaty’s abeyance is already reshaping alliances and strategic calculations in the region. China’s announcement to accelerate the construction of Mohmand Dam in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of northwestern Pakistan, along with its earlier support for the Diamer-Bhasha Dam at Chilas in Gilgit-Baltistan, underscores Beijing’s strategic involvement in Pakistan’s water management sector.
China’s entry into this dynamic may serve to apply some pressure on India. India is an upper riparian to Pakistan and Bangladesh, but a lower riparian to China—especially for rivers like the Indus, Brahmaputra and Sutlej. Although the volume of water entering from the Chinese territory is relatively limited, this geographical reality adds complexity to India’s water security.
For its part, India too has introduced an external partner into the mix by engaging with Afghanistan. After New Delhi’s outreach to Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, Kabul announced plans for a major hydroelectric dam on the Kunar River. The 300-mile-long Kunar, which originates in the Hindu Kush and merges with the Kabul River before entering Pakistan, is another critical water source for Pakistan’s people and economy. India’s move to involve Afghanistan—another upper riparian country—may further threaten Pakistan, as it does not have a transboundary water sharing agreement with Afghanistan despite nine shared river basins and Islamabad’s frequent attempts to initiate a treaty.
Recognizing Afghanistan’s potential role, China has also swiftly engaged with the Taliban regime. Beijing has secured assurances that Afghan territory will not be used against Chinese interests and moved to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. China’s actions appear to be a calculated move to counter India’s efforts to align upper riparian Afghanistan with its strategic objectives, thereby reinforcing Beijing’s support for Islamabad and signaling to New Delhi that it stands firmly by its ally. As India and China both try to court Afghanistan, Kabul’s hydro-policy orientation will be a critical determinant of regional geopolitics in the coming years.
Pakistan’s response—seeking strategic collaboration with China to safeguard its long-term water security—underscores how the treaty’s abeyance is already reshaping alliances and strategic calculations in the region.
Bangladesh, another lower riparian state in South Asia, is closely observing the IWT developments. With the Ganga Waters Treaty (GWT) set to expire in 2026, the current context may cast a shadow over the renegotiation process as India may demand to modify the treaty to consider its emerging water demands and the evolving hydro-climatic realities of the region. Bangladesh shares almost 54 rivers including the Ganga with India. Prolonged abeyance of the IWT may undermine Bangladesh’s trust in India’s water-sharing commitments.
The domestic political situation in India adds an extra layer of complexity to hydro-political relations between these two neighbors. West Bengal, a critical state in India-Bangladesh water diplomacy, is going to hold state assembly elections in the coming year. Both the GWT and the controversial Teesta water-sharing agreement are politically contentious within the state because of concerns about water availability and potential environmental impacts. China can capitalize on this scenario as it has already been embraced by Bangladesh in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project.
The Road Ahead
Among the range of responses that India adopted following the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, the suspension of the IWT stands out as both symbolically and strategically significant; New Delhi has argued that such a response is within its rights in order to safeguard its national integrity against cross-border terrorism. Although Pakistan has called it an “act of war” and urged for the restoration of the treaty, India remains firm on the “abeyance” until Islamabad “credibly and irrevocably” abjures support to cross-border terrorism.
However, the abeyance of the IWT affects not only bilateral hydro-cooperation between India and Pakistan but also the larger politics of water-sharing in South Asia. India’s treaties with Nepal and Bangladesh may come under question, while China is likely to take advantage of rising opportunities to deepen its strategic and hydrological presence in the region. Considering both India and China’s recent engagements, Afghanistan has also become a key player in regional hydro-political dynamics. This evolving situation highlights the intricacies of regional cooperation over shared waters in South Asia and New Delhi should give keen attention to initiating steps to enhance trust and solidarity among its riparian neighbors even as it considers modifying the IWT.
Thanks to South Asian Voices
